9/11 Commission Aviation Security Recommendations
September 27, 2004
9/11 Commission Aviation Security Recommendations
The 9/11 Commission included many aviation'specific recommendations in their Report and Executive Summary.
Commission Report Recommendations:
Planning:
Report Recommendations: The U.S. government should —
Identify and evaluate the transportation assets that need to be protected,
Set risk-based priorities for defending them,
Select the most practical and cost-effective ways of doing so, and
Develop a plan, budget, and funding to implement the effort.
The plan should assign roles and missions to the relevant authorities (federal, state, regional, and local) and to private stakeholders.
Layered Security Approach:
Report Recommendations: The TSA must have multiple layers of security in place to defeat the more plausible and dangerous forms of attack against public transportation.
Pre-screening:
Report Recommendations: Improved use of "no-fly" and "automatic selectee" lists should not be delayed while the argument about a successor to CAPPS continues.
This screening function should be performed by the TSA, and it should utilize the larger set of watch lists maintained by the federal government.
Air carriers should be required to supply the information needed to test and implement this new system.
Executive Summary Recommendation: In aviation, prevent arguments about a new computerized profiling system from delaying vital improvements in the "no-fly" and "automatic selectee" lists.
Biometrics:
Executive Summary Recommendations: Address problems of screening people with biometric identifiers across agencies and governments, including our border and transportation systems, by designing a comprehensive screening system that addresses common problems and sets common standards.
As standards spread, this necessary and ambitious effort could dramatically strengthen the world's ability to intercept individuals who could pose catastrophic threats.
Passenger, Baggage and Cargo Screening:
Report Recommendation: The TSA and the Congress must give priority attention to improving the ability of screening checkpoints to detect explosives on passengers.
As a start, each individual selected for special screening should be screened for explosives.
Further, the TSA should conduct a human factors study, a method often used in the private sector, to understand problems in screener performance and set attainable objectives for individual screeners and for the checkpoints where screening takes place.
The TSA should expedite the installation of advanced (in-line) baggage'screening equipment. Because the aviation industry will derive substantial benefits from this deployment, it should pay a fair share of the costs.
The TSA should require that every passenger aircraft carrying cargo must deploy at least one hardened container to carry any suspect cargo.
TSA also needs to intensify its efforts to identify, track, and appropriately screen potentially dangerous cargo in both the aviation and maritime sectors.
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